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Historians as rooted cosmopolitans:  
their potentials and limitations  
HIRO SAITO 
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University,  
90 Stamford Road, Level 4, Singapore 178903  
hirosaito@smu.edu.sg  
Abstract   In the 1990s, the so-called ‘history problem’ began to escalate in East Asia 
as the result of mutually reinforcing nationalist commemorations in Japan, South 
Korea and China. In response, historians from the three countries organized joint 
historical research and textbook projects. In this article, I examine the extent to which 
these joint projects succeeded in promoting the cosmopolitan logic of historiography 
that challenged nationalist commemorations. Specifically, I compare governmental 
and non-governmental projects and illustrate structural and dispositional mechan-
isms that facilitated the cosmopolitan logic of historiography. However, at the same 
time, I show that the joint projects have had only a limited impact on official and 
public commemorations because of the absence of any formal institutional links 
between historians’ activities, governments and the public. Thus, while historians 
have the potential to act as rooted cosmopolitans and to mobilize transnational 
epistemic networks in East Asia, they have been unable effectively to counteract 
nationalist commemorations.  
Keywords   COSMOPOLITANISM, HISTORIANS, NATIONALISM, TRANSNATIONAL EPISTEMIC 
NETWORKS, EAST ASIA 
 
The Asia-Pacific War ended on 15 August 1945 when Japan surrendered to the Allied 
Powers. Nonetheless, the war continues to haunt Japan’s relations with its neigh-
bouring countries. Japan has engaged in intense controversies, especially with South 
Korea and China, over how the Japanese government should commemorate the war. 
People refer to these controversies, which range from how to interpret the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trial to the contents of Japanese history textbooks, as the ‘history problem’. 
They began to intensify in the 1990s when the newly established Japanese Society for 
History Textbook Reform (JSHTR) and its political allies disputed historical facts 
about Japan’s past aggression (Kim and Schwartz 2010; Shin et al. 2007). The people 
and governments of South Korea and China responded by increasing their criticisms 
of Japan through demonstrations and statements, with anti-Japanese sentiments 
reaching an all-time high in the mid-2000s.1  
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The history problem thus escalated as the result of mutually reinforcing nationalist 
commemorations (Berger 2012; He 2009; Lind 2008). When people commemorate 
the past according to the logic of nationalism, they tend to focus on what happened to 
their co-nationals without sufficient regard for foreign others. Nationalist commemor-
ation also allows people to elevate their version of history to the status of ‘truth’ and 
refuse to acknowledge other versions of history held by foreign others (Todorov 
2003). As nationalist commemorations collided with one another, they turned the 
history problem into an intractable conflict in East Asia. 
In response to the escalating history problem, in the early 2000s historians from 
Japan, South Korea and China began to organize joint historical research and textbook 
projects (Kasahara 2010; Müller 2011; Saito 2008; Shin and Sneider 2011). These 
joint projects aimed to shift a primary unit of historiography from the nation to 
transnational interactions and encourage historians of multiple nationalities to pool 
archival materials and exchange their interpretations, so that perspectives of foreign 
others could be incorporated into historical narratives. In this respect, participants in 
the joint projects pursued a new, ‘cosmopolitan’ logic of historiography that opened 
up the process and content of historical research and writing beyond national borders 
(Beck et al. 2009; Levy and Sznaider 2006, 2010).  
In this article, I examine the extent to which these joint projects succeeded in 
promoting the cosmopolitan logic of historiography to challenge nationalist commem-
orations. By comparing governmental and non-governmental projects, I illustrate 
structural and dispositional mechanisms that facilitated the cosmopolitan logic of 
historiography – an identificatory frame (nationally bounded versus unbounded) that 
is structurally dominant, and dispositions of participants (degrees of openness to 
foreign others) that situationally influence interactional dynamics. In addition, I show 
that the joint projects have had only a limited impact on official and public commem-
orations because of a lack of institutional connections in Japan, South Korea and 
China between historians’ activities and their respective governments and publics. 
Thus, while historians have the potential to act as ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ (Appiah 
2006; Beck 2003) and to mobilize transnational epistemic networks in East Asia, they 
have been unable effectively to counteract nationalist commemorations. In con-
clusion, I explore theoretical implications of the East Asian case by probing how 
‘historians’ debates’ (Habermas 1989) at the transnational level could be better 
organized and harnessed to overcome nationalist biases in official and public 
commemorations. 
Historians, nationalism, cosmopolitanism 
At first glance, historians are unlikely agents of ‘cosmopolitanism’, a set of schemas, 
discourses and institutions that take humanity, rather than nationality, as a primary 
frame of reference and thereby legitimate openness to foreign others (Beck 2006; 
Beck and Sznaider 2010; Delanty 2009). This is because historians have traditionally 
played a key role in nation-building (Berger and Lorenz 2010; Berger et al. 1999). 
Historians have typically used the nation as a primary unit of analysis, helping to 
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naturalize it as a primordial entity. They have also created professional associations 
and delimited their membership along national borders consistently with the nation-
alist idea of self-determination; for example, when Japanese historians write about the 
history of Japan, they often talk among themselves without consulting foreign 
historians who study Japan. This nationally bounded content focus and membership 
reinforces the logic of nationalism that divides the world into discrete nations. Thus, 
even though historians are not necessarily supporters of nationalism, they have 
participated in nation building as authoritative narrators of national history 
(Hobsbawm 1996). 
At the same time, historians have regularly criticized nationalists for their ten-
dency to simplify the past in order to create national myths and identity (Kumar 
2006). Historians are acutely aware that historical evidence is often so complex and 
incomplete that facts and interpretations of historical events are inevitably subject to 
controversy and future revisions. While nationalists often resort to emotionally 
charged commemoration to transform these open-ended historical controversies into 
immutable historical truths as foundations of national identity (Todorov 2003), 
historians have critiqued such nationalist commemoration by exposing factual errors 
and unwarranted interpretations in the light of available evidence (Smith 1999). 
In fact, over the last several decades, historians have become more critical of 
nationalism, as evinced by the recent growth of transnational and global historiog-
raphy focusing on economic, political, social and cultural interactions that traverse 
national borders (Iriye 2013; Middell and Roura 2013). Coterminous with the 
transnational-global turn in historiography is the worldwide institutionalization of 
cosmopolitanism or ‘world culture’ (Lechner and Boli 2005). Recent comparative 
studies (Benavot and Braslavsky 2007; Schissler and Soysal 2005) have demonstrated 
that even education systems, quintessential state apparatuses of nation-building, now 
legitimate cosmopolitan schemas through human-rights education and emphasis on 
world citizenship. Specifically, more and more education systems around the world 
define the person as someone who ‘should be able to function as a supra-national 
citizen, and reflect from a more universal point of view on local and national history. 
In other words, the individual student is to become a member of a newly-developing 
identity called “humanity”’ (Meyer 2007: 264). 
The Joint German–Polish Textbook Commission, founded in 1972 on the initi-
atives of the West German and Polish United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Commissions, was a forerunner of this growing 
cosmopolitanism in historiography. West German and Polish historians tried to 
‘pursue the principal objective of exploring possible prejudices, stereotypes and 
misrepresentations of facts in the history and geography textbooks used in both 
countries, and to advocate for objective representations of the often conflict-laden 
history of relations between the two countries’2 through these UNESCO initiatives. 
As Ulrich Beck (2005: 42–3) stated, this cosmopolitan logic involves  
acknowledging the history (and the memories) of the ‘other’ and integrating 
them into one’s own history … [such] that the national monologues of 
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victimization that are celebrated as national memory are systematically 
replaced by transnational forms and forums of memory and dialogue, which 
also enable the innermost aspects of the national realm – the founding of myths 
– to be opened up to and for one another. 
Thus, the joint German–Polish textbook project, as well as similar joint projects in 
other parts of the world, represents the emergence of cosmopolitan historiography that 
shifts content focus from the nation to transnational interactions while engaging 
historians of multiple nationalities in the process of historical research and writing. 
In this respect, historians increasingly position themselves to act as ‘rooted cosmo-
politans’, as those who are based in single countries but endowed with openness to 
foreign others (Beck 2003). Rooted cosmopolitans typically include immigrants whose 
biographies and social ties crisscross multiple nation-states (Appiah 2006) as well as 
activists who form transnational advocacy and solidarity networks by mobilizing 
domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance shared goals (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). Here, too, one can see historians as rooted cosmo-
politans because they have the potential to form transnational epistemic networks by 
organizing international conferences and sharing methods, standards of excellence 
and training programmes that can transcend national borders (Drori et al. 2006).  
It is, of course, problematic to assume that all historians and their activities are 
moving in a cosmopolitan direction, for cosmopolitanism is not replacing nationalism 
in a zero-sum manner. Instead, since nationalism continues to operate as a central 
organizing principle of social life in the contemporary world, the relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism is open-ended (Meyer 2000; Soysal 1994). While 
UN organizations promote human rights, national governments are still responsible 
for implementing them in education systems and other societal institutions. Similarly, 
even though membership in humanity is emphasized, national citizenship continues to 
play an important role in organizing economic, political and social activities. Thus, as 
several social theorists have already pointed out, cosmopolitanism and nationalism 
coexist and articulate in a complex manner (Beck and Sznaider 2010; Calhoun 2008; 
Delanty 2009; Saito 2011).  
Given this coexistence of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, we need to establish 
whether and how transnational joint projects might promote the cosmopolitan logic of 
historiography. Although transnational joint projects receive increasing institutional 
legitimation, their outcomes still depend on how historians of multiple nationalities 
work through tensions and even contradictions between cosmopolitanism and nation-
alism as two logics of historiography. Put another way, what mechanisms facilitate 
the cosmopolitan logic of historiography in the face of persistent nationalism? 
Data and historical background 
In the remainder of the article, I examine this question in the context of the East Asian 
history problem. As the history problem intensified in recent decades, it generated 
multiple joint activities among historians in Japan, South Korea and China – the East 
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Asian case offers extensive data for exploring the mechanisms that either facilitated 
or forestalled the cosmopolitan logic of historiography. Specifically, I compare the 
non-governmental, trilateral joint history textbook project, ‘History that Opens the 
Future’ (2002–05), with the bilateral governmental Joint Historical Research Projects 
between Japan and South Korea (2002–05, 2007–10) and between Japan and China 
(2006–10). I chose the History that Opens the Future because it is the largest non-
governmental joint project and Japan–South Korea and Japan–China Joint Historical 
Research Projects because they are the only government-sponsored projects to date.  
Although I focus on the three joint projects launched in the 2000s, it is important 
to note that transnational joint activities in East Asia had already begun in the early 
1980s, when nationalist biases in Japanese history textbooks drew strong criticisms 
from Asian countries for the first time since the end of the Asia-Pacific War. In 
response to the criticisms, Japanese historians formed the Comparative History and 
History Education Research Group in Tokyo in December 1982. Since August 1984, 
this research group had organized the East Asia History Education Symposium every 
five years by inviting South Korean and Chinese historians to exchange interpre-
tations of historical events in the region.3  
Transnational joint activities to counteract nationalist biases took off in the mid-
1990s, when nationalist intellectuals established JSHTR to criticize textbook descrip-
tions of Japan’s past aggression as ‘masochistic’ and instead promote patriotism in 
history education (Nozaki 2005; Saaler 2005). In December 1997, the Japan History 
Education Research Group and the South Korea History Textbook Research Group 
began holding joint symposiums on Japanese and South Korean history textbooks. 
Then, in June 2000, the two research groups published Perspectives on Japanese and 
South Korean History Textbooks, which was a collection of research reports by sym-
posium participants. One of the most important themes of these joint symposiums was 
to rethink a historiography centred on one’s country. As one of the participants, Yi 
Chon Hee, put it, ‘if teachers cannot avoid making lessons centred on the history of 
their own country, it’s important for them to link their history to universality and 
cosmopolitanism, so that they can relativize and objectify their history to go beyond 
prejudices’ (Rekishi Kyōiku Kenkyūkai 2000: 29).  
In addition, in March 2002 and January 2003, the History Educationalist Confer-
ence of Japan and the South Korea National Association of History Teachers organ-
ized a series of joint symposiums to explore lesson plans and material for teaching the 
history of relations between Japan and South Korea. These would steer the nation 
away from its central focus on history education while counteracting the nationalist 
biases present in history education in the two countries.4 Professors of history and 
history education from Japan and South Korea had also organized a joint symposium 
in Tokyo in December 2001. They regarded the JSHTR history textbook as ‘inappro-
priate’ and thought that it failed in its quest to ‘seek historical truths and facilitate 
mutual understanding and peaceful cooperation’. They later signed an agreement to 
promote collaborative research between Japan and South Korea.5  
Between Japan and China, by contrast, it was difficult for historians to organize 
joint activities because of the Chinese government’s policy. In 1994, the Japanese 
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government, under Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s leadership, began planning 
joint historical research with China. In the autumn of 1995, however, the Communist 
Party Propaganda Department, the State Education Commission and the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences reportedly issued a secret directive to ban Chinese his-
torians from participating in research projects sponsored by the Japanese government 
(He 2009). Although the Chinese side later retracted the directive, it still insisted that 
Japanese and Chinese historians should not collaborate: ‘since Japan’s aggression 
toward China is an objective historical fact, there is no need for joint historical 
research to create new historical understandings or re-evaluate existing ones. … We 
will support historical research only if its purpose is to make Japanese people 
remorseful’ (reprinted in Amako and Sonoda 1998: 123). 
The trilateral joint history textbook project 
Nevertheless, a small but important development occurred in Beijing in July 2001. At 
an international symposium that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences organized 
on Japan’s militarism, Japanese participants Arai Shin’ichi and Tawara Yoshifumi 
proposed that they and their Chinese and South Korean counterparts create a forum 
for exchanging their historical views and collaborating on historical education. Arai, 
one of the best-known Japanese historians of Japan’s wartime atrocities, had served as 
co-director of the Centre for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Respon-
sibility; Tawara was secretary-general of the Children and Textbooks Japan Network 
21, an NGO that lobbied the Japanese government to reject the JSTHR textbook. The 
Chinese Academy welcomed the proposal and organized the Forum on Historical 
Understanding and Peace in East Asia in Nanjing in March 2002. At the forum, 
participants from Japan, South Korea and China agreed to produce a history textbook 
jointly (Tawara 2005). 
To implement the joint history textbook project, participants from the three 
countries held the first editorial meeting in Seoul in August 2002. The Japanese side 
consisted of university professors, high school history teachers and members of 
Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 and the Asian Network for History 
Education in Japan. The Japanese members included Kasahara Tokushi, a history 
professor known for his research on Japan’s wartime atrocities in China. The South 
Korean side consisted mostly of university professors and high school history teachers 
affiliated with NGOs involved in investigating historical facts about Japan’s wartime 
atrocities; for example, the Council for Correcting Japanese Textbooks (later renamed 
Solidarity for Peace in Asia and History Education) and the Korean Council for the 
Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. The Chinese side consisted of 
members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, university professors and 
doctoral students in history and history education, and researchers at the Nanjing 
Massacre Memorial Hall – most of them specialized in the Second Sino-Japanese War 
and Japan’s wartime atrocities in China. While the Japanese and South Korean sides 
had members who had prior experience in collaborative activities to create common 
teaching materials, the Chinese side had none (Saito 2008: 20–7). 
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At the first editorial meeting in Seoul, the participants agreed on three goals: (1) to 
focus on modern history, such as the history of the Asia-Pacific War; (2) to organize a 
textbook thematically; and (3) to correct nationalist biases in the historiographies of 
the three countries. The participants held eleven editorial meetings between August 
2002 and April 2005. Throughout the joint history textbook project, the participants 
from the three countries engaged in three-way criticisms of the nationalist biases in 
their drafts. Because the participants’ understandings of what historiography should 
comprise differed, these criticisms were at times heated (Park 2011).  
Given these differences, the participants strongly disagreed over how to write the 
section on the Nanjing massacre. The draft that the Chinese side originally submitted 
to illustrate the massacre of 300,000 people contained graphic pictures and descrip-
tions of rapes, looting and atrocities. In response, the Japanese side raised several 
objections. First, students could not properly understand either the Nanjing massacre 
or the second Sino–Japanese War unless the textbook described the sequence of 
events that took the Japanese military to Nanjing in the first place. Second, if the text-
book description of the massacre focused exclusively on its cruelty and the number 
dead, it might simply reproduce the Chinese government’s official commemoration. 
Third, when discussing the damages and numbers dead in the massacre, it was 
important to use reliable historical evidence and to share the latest research findings 
from both Japanese and Chinese sides. After considering the Chinese and Japanese 
versions, the editorial board agreed that it was better to present a comprehensive 
rendering of the Nanjing massacre based on historical evidence than to pass down the 
Chinese government’s official commemoration to the next generation uncritically. 
The editorial board therefore decided not to present 300,000 as the correct number of 
dead. Instead, the board opted to cite the various estimates of dead revealed at the 
Nanjing military tribunal and the Tokyo trial, as well as to give detailed descriptions 
of the historical events leading up to the massacre. Thus, the Chinese side agreed to 
deviate from the Chinese government’s official line on the massacre (Saito 2008: 53–8). 
Another point of contention was how to describe civilian victims of the Asia-
Pacific War. At first, the Japanese side presented a draft chapter that discussed both 
the Japanese bombings of Chongqing and the Allied powers’ nuclear attack on and 
firebombings of Japanese cities as examples of ‘indiscriminate bombings’. The South 
Koreans and Chinese responded by expressing the following concerns. First, they 
considered it inappropriate to group Chinese and Japanese victims together. Second, 
they mentioned that there are people in the countries that suffered from Japan’s 
aggression who regard the atomic bombings in a positive light because they ended the 
war. Third, by emphasizing the ‘inhumane’ aspects of the atomic bombings, the 
Japanese side risked downplaying its own war responsibility. In the end, the editorial 
board decided against using the pictures of dead bodies that the Japanese side had 
originally submitted. Instead, it decided to focus on detailed descriptions of the capa-
bilities of the nuclear weapon and firebombs and to print Japanese survivors’ 
testimonies of the bombings. This inclusion of the descriptions of Japanese victims 
was a significant departure from mainstream history textbooks used in South Korea 
and China: prior to the 2000s no South Korean history textbooks mentioned the 
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nuclear bombings, while some Chinese history textbooks began including only very 
short references to the wartime atomic bombings in the mid-1990s (Saito 2008: 76–9). 
After three years of discussion, in May 2005 the editorial board published the joint 
history textbook, History that Opens the Future, in the three different languages and 
countries. Its purpose was to counteract nationalist commemorations of the Asia-
Pacific War in Japan and to ‘criticize the JSHTR history textbook that justifies 
Japan’s war of aggression and colonial rule, distorts historical facts, looks down on 
Asia from a Japan-centred xenophobic perspective, and promotes narrow-minded 
nationalism’ (Nitchūkan Sangoku Kyōtsū Rekishi Kyōzai Iinkai 2005: 221). In 
conformity with the board’s editorial policy, the focus of the joint history textbook 
was on Japan’s aggression, wartime atrocities and colonial rule in the context of 
international relations in East Asia at the time.6 
Bilateral joint historical research projects 
In the 2000s, the Japanese, South Korean and Chinese governments responded to the 
escalating history problem by organizing similar joint projects. First, in May 2002, the 
Japanese and South Korean governments launched a joint historical research project 
following an agreement between Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō and President 
Kim Dae Jung during the latter’s visit to South Korea in October 2001. Each govern-
ment commissioned 11 historians and divided the project into three sub-committees to 
cover the ancient, middle and modern contemporary historical periods respectively. 
Between May 2002 and March 2005, the members of the joint project had meetings in 
both Japan and South Korea and published a final report in June 2006.  
Mitani Taichirō , a professor of Japanese politics and diplomacy at the University 
of Tokyo who chaired the joint project, hoped that they could create ‘an academic 
community of historians that transcends national borders through the joint historical 
research project [because] the problem of history textbooks is rooted ultimately in 
various controversies over history of relations between Japan and South Korea’. At 
the same time, he recognized that it was difficult to create such a transnational aca-
demic community, ‘particularly in the discipline of history because every country has 
a tradition of national history – the discipline of history contributed to the formation 
of nationalism’.7 In fact, in the final report several South Korean members expressed 
their frustration with the Japanese. In particular, they questioned why the Japanese 
refused to discuss the issue of history textbooks, even though it had motivated the 
joint project in the first place. They also noted that both Japanese and South Korean 
sides failed adequately to address nationalist biases in their own versions of history. 
Chung Jae Jeong, a history professor at Seoul City University, observed that ‘every 
commission member felt pressured to speak on behalf of his government … and this 
increased distrust and misunderstanding between the two sides.’ Kim Hyon Gu, a 
professor of history education at Korea University, was also disappointed that ‘neither 
side could move away from self-centred nationalism in any significant way.’8 
Although their lack of progress frustrated the project members, they nonetheless 
agreed that it was important to continue the dialogue between Japanese and South 
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Korean historians. Consequently, the Japanese and South Korean governments pro-
ceeded to launch a second round of the joint historical research project in June 2007. 
This time the governments extended the project by setting up a sub-committee on 
history textbooks. This new sub-committee, consisting of 12 members in total, was 
also the largest.9 It convened multiple meetings in Japan and South Korea between 
June 2007 and November 2009 and published its final report in March 2010. Again, 
the Japanese and South Korean project members had strong disagreements over the 
interpretation of various historical events. The debates of the new sub-committee 
were particularly intense. In fact, the South Korean members of the committee later 
reflected on their meetings that ‘since both sides engaged in criticisms that came close 
to personal attacks, we couldn’t have scholarly debates’ and ‘committee members 
were unable to have constructive discussion because they lacked mutual trust’ 
(reprinted in Kasahara 2010: 263–4). Despite these problems, however, the partici-
pants agreed that it was important to continue the joint project. In their final report,10 
the Japanese and South Korean project leaders, Toriumi Yasushi and Cho Kwang, 
emphasized the importance of building a transnational network of historians who 
were able to share archival materials and to debate historical facts and interpretations. 
Therefore, during the summit meeting on 18 December 2011, Prime Minister Noda 
Yoshihiko and President Lee Myung Bak drew up an agreement to organize a third 
round of the joint historical research project.  
The Japanese government began to plan a project with China along the same lines 
as its bilateral joint historical research project with South Korea. On 17 April 2005, 
when anti-Japanese feelings were running high in China, Japan’s Foreign Minister 
Machimura Nobutaka met his Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing in Beijing and they 
agreed to embark on a joint historical research project. When Abe Shinzō became 
new prime minister in September 2006, he immediately visited Beijing in an attempt 
to repair Japan’s relations with China, which Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine 
and the controversy over the JSHTR history textbook had damaged. During the 
summit meeting, Abe and Hu Jintao, China’s president, agreed to proceed with a joint 
project. On 26 December 2006, the two governments launched the Japan–China Joint 
Historical Research Project by defining the goal of the project as follows: ‘deepen 
objective understanding of Sino–Japanese relations over two thousand years, includ-
ing the unfortunate period in modern history and the postwar period, so that people in 
Japan and China can better understand each other.’11 
To this end, the Japanese and Chinese governments commissioned 20 historians. 
They divided the project between two sub-committees, each of which was to deal 
with a particular historical period, namely ancient to middle period or modern to 
contemporary. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, a professor of diplomatic history at the University 
of Tokyo, and Bu Ping, a professor of modern Chinese history at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, who had also participated in History that Opens the 
Future, co-chaired the project. Between December 2006 and December 2009, project 
members held multiple meetings to discuss their research papers and to exchange 
comments on the history of Japan–China relations. Then, in January 2010, the 
Japanese and Chinese governments published a final report.  
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The final report adopted a ‘parallel history’ format, which consisted of a pair of 
Japanese and Chinese historians each writing their own paper on a particular his-
torical event or period. Interestingly, the Japanese and Chinese historians converged 
on the interpretation that Japan had waged a war of aggression against China, though 
there was already a hint of this convergence at the first meeting of the joint project 
when Kitaoka stated that ‘our country sent troops to China and victimized many 
Chinese people. Nobody in Japan denies this fact.’12 Research on the Nanjing 
Massacre yielded yet another convergence. Japanese project member Shōji Jun’ichirō, 
a historian at the Ministry of Defence, was able to report that all the members of the 
sub-committee on modern to contemporary history agreed that it was more important 
to examine how and why the massacre occurred rather than determine the numbers 
killed. In other words, they agreed that the Nanjing Massacre was a historical fact that 
needed explaining and, therefore, the number of dead should be subject to further 
empirical research (Shoji 2010). 
At the same time, however, the final report failed to include two components of 
the joint project, namely papers on the contemporary period (after 1945) and com-
ments on all the papers. Originally, project members on both the Japanese and 
Chinese sides agreed to incorporate these two components into the final report and 
were on course to publish their papers and comments in late 2008. Then, after the 
Chinese government reportedly intervened, the Chinese members changed their 
original position and proposed that they should not publish the comments. The 
Chinese members subsequently hardened their position even further by refusing to 
publish any of the papers. Kitaoka found that position unacceptable, so embarked on 
negotiations with the Chinese side and a year later, in August 2009, the Chinese 
eventually agreed to publish all the papers, apart from six on the post-1945 period, 
without comments. Throughout the negotiations, China’s project leader Bu repeatedly 
told the Japanese side that they wanted to publish all the outcomes of their joint 
historical research, but that it was difficult for them to do so because of ‘various 
pressures’ (Kitaoka 2010: 230–4). 
Despite these obstacles, both Kitaoka and Bu evaluated the outcome of the joint 
project positively. They believed that both the Japanese and the Chinese members had 
managed to reach ‘the level of proper scholarship where both sides can say ‘even 
though I cannot agree with the other side’s opinion, I can at least understand how the 
other side came to such an opinion.’ In fact, they had reached a point where the 
members could handle their disagreements over historical facts and interpretations 
professionally and at the same time maintain scholarly rigour and collegiality.13 
Given the generally positive reactions from the project leaders and other participants, 
Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo and President Hu Jintao agreed to continue the joint 
project during their summit meeting in May 2008. 
The structural and dispositional mechanisms of cosmopolitan historiography 
I argue that the non-governmental joint project was more successful than govern-
mental ones in promoting the cosmopolitan logic of historiography. The trilateral 
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textbook project allowed historians from Japan, South Korea and China to criticize 
each other’s nationalist biases. They not only incorporated dialogues with foreign 
historians more effectively into the process of historical research but also shifted the 
content focus from the nation to transnational interactions and discussed what had 
happened to foreign others and how they had suffered during the Asia-Pacific War. 
The governmental joint projects, by contrast, appeared to have difficulty facilitating 
cosmopolitanism among the participants. In fact, the long resistance of the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards revisiting the 1965 basic treaty between Japan 
and South Korea placed a severe constraint on the Japan–South Korea Joint Project. 
The ministry feared that any reinterpretation of historical events mentioned in the 
basic treaty, such as Japan’s 1910 annexation of Korea, might pave the way for new 
compensation claims. One official in the ministry reportedly said that ‘there is no 
room for a joint historical research project to reinterpret the 1965 Basic Treaty. Since 
reinterpretation of the Basic Treaty could lead to reignite the problem of compen-
sation, the possibility of scholarly agreement between Japanese and South Korean 
sides is extremely small.’14 The Japan–China Joint Project experienced similar con-
straints when the Chinese government forbade its historians to publish the results of 
the joint project. 
I suggest that the differences between the non-governmental and governmental 
projects revolve around the different frames of identification they support (Anderson 
1998). Participants in joint projects have two different frames of identification. The 
first is a nationally bounded frame, such as ‘Japanese’, ‘South Korean’ or ‘Chinese’. 
The second is a nationally unbounded one, namely ‘historian’. The non-governmental 
project foregrounded the nationally unbounded frame of identification – the historian 
who is concerned about the escalation of the history problem – and this framing 
allowed the participants to suspend their national identifications to a significant 
extent. In contrast, the governmental projects foregrounded the nationally bounded 
frame and positioned participants as representatives of their countries. This kind of 
structural constraint made it difficult for the participants to be open to foreign 
perspectives and dialogically transform their original positions. 
The different outcomes of the non-governmental and governmental projects also 
seem to depend on the participants’ dispositions – on the degree of their openness 
towards foreign others. For example, the Japanese participants in the non-
governmental project included many left-leaning historians, like Kasahara, who had 
actively engaged in the social movement against nationalist politicians and 
intellectuals. History that Opens the Future was, in some respects, an outgrowth of 
the existing transnational network of advocacy-oriented NGOs that had pressed the 
Japanese government in terms of apology and compensation for foreign victims of 
Japan’s past aggression. The dispositions of participants can also partially explain the 
struggle of the Japan–South Korea joint project, where the Japanese government 
appointed Furuta Hiroshi, a history professor at Tsukuba University known for his 
belief in the Japanese people’s superiority over Koreans (Furuta 2010). In turn, the 
Korean side included Yi Man Yol, a chair of the National History Committee, who 
insisted that ‘any research on Korea must presuppose love for Korea. … Only with 
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very strong love for Korea, Japanese historians can begin to understand Korean 
history correctly.’15 These two historians, both of whom had strong nationalist dis-
positions, sat on the same sub-committee and contributed towards spreading distrust 
among the other participants. The dispositions of the participants therefore constituted 
the second, individual-level mechanism that facilitates or forestalls the cosmopolitan 
logic of historiography because, situationally, they influence interactional dynamics 
among historians. 
In short, the trilateral project was more successful in promoting the cosmopolitan 
logic of historiography because the nationally unbounded frame of identification was 
dominant and dispositions of participants were open. The nationally bounded frame of 
identification constrained the Japan–South Korea and Japan–China governmental 
joint projects, but the participants in the Japan–China joint project seemed to be more 
open to each other. 
It is important to note, however, that the success of History that Opens the Future 
came at a cost. Saito Kazuharu, a Japanese participant in the joint project, rightly 
cautioned that ‘facile border-crossing, which fails to critically examine the nature of 
dialogue and solidarity … may lead the joint history textbook to disseminate wrong 
understandings’ (Saito 2008: 87–8). Put another way, if the Japanese side simply 
expressed ‘facile solidarity’ with the South Korean and Chinese sides and allowed 
problematic historical facts and interpretations to remain, it could undermine the very 
purpose of the joint project, namely to criticize nationalist biases on all sides. This 
risk was particularly great among participants in the non-governmental joint project 
who had previously engaged in advocacy activities that tended to sacrifice scholarly 
rigour for political gains (Kemmochi et al. 2009; Pingel 2008a). 
In fact, the Japanese participants in History that Opens the Future appeared to 
sacrifice scholarly rigour for facile solidarity when they agreed to include a sentence 
stating that the Japanese army had intentionally started the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident in July 1937, the incident that led to the full-scale war between Japan and 
China. This sentence came under heavy criticism from the community of Japanese 
historians who, based on available evidence, reached the conclusion that the Japanese 
military had not intentionally started the incident. 
Indeed, Falk Pingel, a long-time member of the Georg Eckert Institute for Inter-
national Textbook Research in Germany, made critical comments about History that 
Opens the Future and other joint projects. Pingel (2008b: 29) stated that ‘in East Asia, 
only Japanese textbooks are accused, while South Korean and Chinese textbooks are 
exempted from critical discussion. Reform is one-sidedly demanded on the Japanese 
side, and it seems impossible to establish open relationships for mutual criticism and 
critical self-reflections on one’s own history.’ Although Pingel’s criticism is some-
what unfair because participants in the joint textbook project did criticize each other’s 
nationalist biases, his criticism nonetheless serves as an important reminder that 
‘facile solidarity’ on Japan’s part could have negative consequences.  
South Korean and Chinese historians have themselves raised this kind of criticism. 
In South Korea, the NGOs that participated in History that Opens the Future 
organized a forum in November 2005 to reflect critically on the textbook they had just 
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produced. At the forum, various participants pointed out that the textbook might have 
over emphasized Japan’s imperialist aggression, leading South Korean students to 
view Japan as an evil country. They also argued that the textbook could have also 
included more descriptions of Japanese people’s sufferings during the war as well as 
more positive aspects of Japanese history. As Lim (2007: 373), a professor of history 
at Hanyang University, put it:  
The asymmetry in historical experience of imperialism and colonialism should 
not be used simply to criticize the nationalist historiography of Japan while 
helping to legitimate the nationalist historiography of South Korea. … Decon-
struction of nationalist historiography cannot be confined within a single 
country but needs to be carried out simultaneously within East Asia as a 
whole. 
Chinese historians, too, have begun to reflect critically on their research practices. 
Take for example, Cheng Zhaoqi and Zhang Lianhong who participated in the joint 
history textbook project that produced History that Opens the Future. When Cheng 
and Zhang attended a conference in Tokyo in January 2007 to discuss the state of 
historical research in China, both of them noted that historical research on the Nanjing 
Massacre had become less emotional in recent years. They also noted that Chinese 
historians had come to recognize that they needed more evidence if they were to 
provide accurate estimates of the numbers killed.16 Bu Ping, who participated in both 
the non-governmental and governmental joint projects, confirmed these changes in 
attitude among Chinese historians. At an international symposium in Tokyo in April 
2008, Bu admitted that, ‘previously, Chinese historians [had] conducted China-
centred research, and their knowledge of historical materials and research available 
outside China was inadequate.’17 To rectify this situation, he emphasized the 
importance of Chinese and Japanese historians pooling their archival materials and 
historical research and reiterated his belief that ‘historical views can, and should, 
transcend national borders’ (Bu 2010: 128). 
Meanwhile, we cannot dismiss too hastily the potential of governmental joint 
projects to facilitate mutual critiques of nationalist biases. Government-sponsored 
joint projects select the most highly regarded professional historians. Indeed, the 
Japan–China joint historical research project ended up resolving the conflict over the 
description of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. In their final report, both Japanese and 
Chinese historians agreed that the battle between the Japanese and Chinese armies at 
the Marco Polo Bridge had started accidentally. In response, Saito Kazuharu, a 
participant in History that Opens the Future, acknowledged ‘on this point, the govern-
mental joint project overcame the obstacle that the non-governmental joint project 
could not’ (Kasahara 2010: 68). Thus, the scholarly rigour that historians pursue has 
the potential to facilitate indirectly the cosmopolitan logic of historiography by 
systematically questioning nationalist biases in the light of available evidence. 
In this respect, the growth of joint projects among historians in Japan, South 
Korea and China points to the emergence of an East Asian equivalent of the West 
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German controversy, known as the historians’ debate (Historikerstreit), which took 
place in the late 1980s over interpretations of the history of Nazi Germany. Jürgen 
Habermas (1989: 226–7), who was critical of nationalist historians who tried to 
rewrite the history of Nazi Germany in the service of the contemporary German 
nation and national identity, insisted on the need to subject history to open-ended 
critical reflections, for such an ongoing controversy 
only reflects the structure of open societies. It provides an opportunity to 
clarify one’s own identity-forming traditions in their ambivalences. This is 
precisely what is needed … for the development of a historical consciousness 
that is equally incompatible with closed images of history that have a 
secondary quasi-natural character and with all forms of conventional, that is, 
prereflexively shared identity’. 
Although Habermas directed his criticism at German nationalism, it is applicable 
to any nationalism around the world, though, in the case of the East Asian history 
problem, it needs scaling up to the transnational level. Indeed, the emerging trans-
national dialogues among historians in East Asia embody concerted efforts to promote 
the cosmopolitan logic of historiography and thereby counteract nationalist biases in 
the ‘historical consciousness’ of people in Japan, China and South Korea.  
Limited influence of historians on the government and the public 
Nevertheless, there is one fundamental problem with these joint projects, whether 
they are non-governmental or governmental – namely, their outcomes have had only a 
very limited impact on official and public commemorations of the Asia-Pacific War. 
This weak influence stems from at least three institutional factors. The first is the de-
politicization of joint projects. Hatano Sumio, a Japanese historian of international 
relations who participated in the Japan–China joint project, made the following obser-
vation. ‘The first objective of the project, from the perspective of the Japanese 
government, was to delegate the history problem to experts and “depoliticize” it, so 
that it will not interfere with Japan’s relations with China regarding such important 
issues as trade, investment, natural resources, and food’ (Hatano 2011: 192). In a 
sense, governmental actors tried to defuse the history problem by framing it exclu-
sively as a scholarly problem. While this framing did bring some cool-headed 
discussion into the escalating history problem, it also prevented the joint projects from 
influencing governments’ official commemorations. Indeed, so long as joint projects 
remain depoliticized, their actual impact on official commemorations will likely 
remain minimal. 
The second factor that limits the influence of joint projects is the disconnection 
that continues to exist between them and the contents of history textbooks. This dis-
connection is engineered by the governments involved. For example, the Chinese 
government not only explicitly separated historical research from history education, 
but it also publicized the final report of the joint project in a very limited way, 
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keeping the majority of Chinese citizens uninformed about the latest research on the 
history of Sino–Japanese relations. The Japanese government likewise tried to 
separate history textbooks from historical research when it began a joint project with 
the South Korean government in 2002. Each country’s textbook inspection system 
reinforces the separation between joint projects and the contents of history textbooks. 
Since none of the teaching materials produced by the non-governmental joint projects 
ever passes the textbook inspections, schools can only use them as informal supple-
mentary materials. In the meanwhile, officially approved history textbooks in Japan, 
South Korea and China continue to teach nation-centred histories according to 
curricular guidelines established by the governments: history textbooks in Japan tend 
to underplay Japan’s past aggression, whereas their equivalents in South Korea and 
China tend to promote patriotism based on legacies of anti-Japanese resistance. 
Through their control of their respective education systems and curricula, the govern-
ments of the three countries thus continue to shape public commemorations in 
nationalist terms (Müller 2011; Shin and Sneider 2011). 
Finally, the heavy reliance on memorization in the teaching of history in all three 
countries further weakens the historians’ influence. Because entrance exams for high 
schools and universities are extremely competitive and based mostly on multiple-
choice questions, Japanese, South Korean and Chinese students are required to absorb 
large amounts of knowledge from elementary to high school. As a result, their history 
education typically forces students preparing for these exams to memorize dates of 
important events and names of prominent figures. Such memorization-based history 
education tends to create the impression that history is a field with clear, distinct 
answers, appropriate for multiple-choice questions. Moreover, memorization-based 
history lessons rarely help students develop the cognitive skills they need to examine 
conflicting historical evidence and to adjudicate between the different interpretations 
– the very cognitive skills required to resolve the history problem.  
Conclusion and implications 
In this article, I have shown that joint projects by historians in Japan, South Korea and 
China do not automatically yield the infrastructures of a new, cosmopolitan logic of 
historiography – historians do not always act as rooted cosmopolitans to counteract 
nationalist commemoration. Specifically, two mechanisms mediate joint projects and 
the cosmopolitan logic of historiography. One is a structural mechanism that 
determines which frame of identification to emphasize, whether nationally bounded or 
unbounded. Another is an individual-level mechanism pertaining to the dispositions 
of the participants. These structural and dispositional mechanisms shape interactional 
dynamics and influence the extent to which historians succeed in pursuing the 
cosmopolitan logic of historiography that focuses on transnational interactions, 
promotes collaboration among historians of multiple nationalities and incorporates the 
foreign other’s perspective into their own historical narratives. I have also pointed out 
the institutional disconnections of these joint projects from official and public com-
memorations in Japan, South Korea and China. As a result, even though historians 
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have the potential to criticize nationalist commemorations and to promote the cosmo-
politan logic of historiography, the people and governments in the three countries 
continue to maintain nationalist biases in their commemorations.  
Nevertheless, we cannot dismiss the efficacy of transnational joint projects in East 
Asia too hastily. For example, at the 2007 symposium on European and East Asian 
joint history textbook projects in Tokyo, many Japanese participants noted that East 
Asian joint projects were less successful than the joint projects between Germany and 
France and between Germany and Poland. However, the German and French 
historians reminded them that the European projects had made progress over time 
through many trials and errors (Kemmochi et al. 2009). Since East Asian joint 
projects have a much shorter history, an important question is how better to organize 
and harness the emerging historians’ debates at the transnational level for overcoming 
nationalist biases in official and public commemorations. 
To this end, both non-governmental and governmental joint projects in East Asia 
need reforming. The non-governmental projects need to apply greater scholarly rigour 
if they are more effectively to be able to detect nationalist biases on all sides (Pingel 
2008a, 2008b). More importantly, given that the governments of Japan, South Korea 
and China exercise high levels of control over public commemorations through 
textbook inspections, they need to follow the examples of the German, French and 
Polish governments by giving the historians’ debates stronger support (Kasahara 
2010). In the light of the shortcomings of the previous joint projects, there are at least 
two ways in which they could do this. The first is to publicize the outcomes of the 
projects more, so that the citizens can learn about the latest scholarly findings that 
challenge their commonly held nationalist biases. The second is to select historians 
for joint projects with cosmopolitan dispositions that lead them to engage in mutually 
transformative conversations over controversial issues. 
The history problem is theoretically important in shedding light on how cosmo-
politanism emerges in the face of nationalism. However, it is also politically 
important because of the territorial disputes simmering over the Takeshima/Dokdo 
and Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In the context of East Asia, for many South Koreans and 
Chinese these disputes inevitably evoke memories of Japan’s past aggression. The 
intersection of these ongoing territorial disputes with the history problem could 
seriously jeopardize international relations in the region. Thus, whether and how the 
people and governments of the three countries can resolve the history problem has 
crucial ramifications for the future of East Asia – and historians have an important 
role to play. 
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